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Abstract
Using unique transactions data for individual high-frequency trading (HFT)
firms in the U.K. equity market, we examine the extent to which the trading
activity of individual HFT firms is correlated with each other and the impact
on price efficiency. We find that HFT order flow, net positions, and total
volume exhibit significantly higher commonality than those of a comparison
group of investment banks. However, intraday HFT order flow commonality
is associated with a permanent price impact, suggesting that commonality
in HFT activity is information-based and so does not generally contribute
to undue price pressure and price dislocations.
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I Introduction
High-frequency trading, where automated computer traders interact at lightning-
fast speed with electronic trading platforms, has become an important feature of
many modern markets. The rapid growth and increased prominence of these ultra
fast traders have given rise to concerns regarding their impact on market quality
and stability. Recent events, such as the “flash crashes” in U.S. equity markets
on May 6, 2010 and U.S. Treasury markets on October 15, 2014, have highlighted
such worries. Over the past few years, numerous empirical studies have analyzed
the market impact of high-frequency trading (HFT), as well as algorithmic trading
(AT) more generally.1,2 With some recent exceptions, most of these studies have
analyzed aggregate measures of HFT and AT in various markets.3 The current
paper aims to shed light on the ways in which individual HFTs interact with each
other and assess the effect of this interaction on price efficiency.
The main purpose of our analysis is to better understand the extent to which
a given HFT firm tends to trade in a similar manner and direction as its high-
frequency competitors. This speaks towards the greater question of whether HFTs
might be a source of concern from the perspective of market stability. A greater
correlation across HFT firms suggests that HFTs act more as a uniform group with
a greater potential for (possibly adverse) market impacts. Whether such correla-
tions among HFTs played an important role in recent flash crashes is not clear, but
is certainly a relevant concern. A clear example—albeit from outside the domain
of HFT—of the possible negative impact of highly correlated strategies among
1Algorithmic trading refers to any automated trading where computers directly interact with
electronic trading platforms; HFT is therefore a subset of AT. Given the focus of the current
paper, in the subsequent discussion we mostly refer to HFT, although many of the arguments
apply to both AT and HFT.
2HFT will be used to denote both high-frequency trader and high-frequency trading ; AT will
be used in an analogous manner. In our data, we can identify the trading activity of individual
high-frequency trading (HFT) firms. We will therefore refer to both HFTs and HFT firms, where
the latter formulation is used to emphasize this unit of observation.
3See, for instance, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), Hendershott and Riordan
(2013), Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014), and Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson,
and Vega (2014).
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a large segment of market participants is provided by the “Quant Meltdown” in
August 2007. During this episode, many long-short equity funds pursuing similar
strategies suffered major losses and quickly unwound their strategies amid great
market turmoil (Khandani and Lo, 2011).
Our data document transactions for the stocks in the U.K. FTSE 100 index,
executed on the electronic limit order book of the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
These data are accessed through the ZEN database, maintained by the U.K. Fi-
nancial Conduct Authority (FCA); our sample spans four months, from September
1 through December 31, 2012. The data explicitly identify the submitter of each
trade report along with other detailed information such as volume, execution price,
and time stamp. We focus on trading in 10 individual HFT firms, which together
represent more than 98 percent of the total HFT volume in our sample. By fo-
cusing on a limited number of large firms, which are behind the vast majority of
high-frequency trading, we are able to conduct a detailed analysis of the interac-
tions between HFT firms. In addition, we also use trade data for the 10 largest
investment banks (IBs) active in our sample. IBs clearly engage in a wide variety
of trading activities. Although these activities might also involve high-frequency
strategies, the overall activities of investment banks are clearly quite distinct from
those of pure HFT firms. We therefore view IBs as a relevant comparison group,
proxying for the behavior of informed traders in the market.
To analyze correlations, and possible causations, between the activities of in-
dividual HFTs in a given stock, we use a high-frequency vector autoregression
(VAR). In particular, for each stock in our sample, we formulate a VAR with trad-
ing activity in all 10 HFTs and all 10 IBs as dependent variables.4 Trading activity
is measured either as (i) order flow (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated
volume), (ii) total transacted volume, or (iii) change-in-inventory (i.e., change in
net position). The VAR is formulated in “trade” time (or “tick” time), such that
4Trading activity by other market participants, not included in these two groups of HFTs
and IBs, is modelled in a final separate equation in the VAR. The VAR thus forms a complete
system of all trading activity, represented by the HFTs, IBs, and the “residual” market.
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the time index only changes when there is a trade event, and is estimated by
pooling data from all stocks, yielding a set of interpretable results. The tick-time
formulation avoids any temporal aggregation of the data and arguably provides
the cleanest way of estimating the relationship between a given trading activity
and subsequent trades.
The main empirical results from the VAR can be summarized as follows. In
a lead-lag (Granger causality) sense, HFT trading activity tends to be strongly
positively related across firms, both for directional and non-directional measures
of activity (i.e., both order flow and total volume). In particular, aggressive buy-
ing (selling) by an HFT is associated with subsequent additional aggressive buying
(selling) by other HFTs. Similarly, changes in inventory for HFTs are also posi-
tively related, such that accumulation (reduction) of inventory in a given stock by
a given HFT tends to be followed by an accumulation (reduction) of inventory in
that same stock by other HFTs. For IBs, we find little evidence of such lead-lag
relationships for either order flow or total volume. Changes in inventory for IBs,
however, are strongly negatively related across IB firms, and also negatively re-
lated to changes in HFT inventory, suggesting that IBs tend to absorb inventory
from each other as well as from HFTs.
The VAR results thus suggest that HFTs do exhibit commonality in their trad-
ing behavior, especially relative to what is observed for IBs. One possible inter-
pretation of this result is that HFT algorithms may have a degree of commonality
embedded in their design, which could potentially give rise to price pressure and
excess volatility, as in the model of Jarrow and Protter (2012). An alternative inter-
pretation is that HFTs use strategies that are uniformly more efficient in receiving,
processing, and trading on information when it arrives at the marketplace, as in
Martinez and Rosu (2013). In this case, the observed commonality is the result of
HFT firms trading on common sources of information.
To test these two hypotheses, we construct a high-frequency metric of HFT and
IB order flow correlation and use it as an explanatory variable in a price impact
4
regression. The key finding is that HFT correlation is associated with a permanent
price impact, whereas IB correlation tends to be associated with price reversals.
This is consistent with HFT commonality being the result of informed trading and
thus contributing to price discovery, along the lines of Martinez and Rosu (2013).
Specifically, our analysis suggests that the times when HFTs exhibit commonality
in their behavior, are in fact times when they each possesses some (correlated)
“private” information and act as informed traders. Correlation in trading activity
among HFTs might therefore, at least partly, be driven by correlations in their
private information signals. This result expands upon previous findings that HFTs,
on average, tend to act as informed traders and trade in the direction of permanent
price changes (e.g., Carrion, 2013, and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan, 2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief lit-
erature review and Section III describes the data and some summary statistics.
Section IV introduces the VAR specification and presents the results on inter-
actions across HFT firms. Section V studies whether these correlation patterns
appear to have any impact on market quality, and Section VI concludes.
II Related Literature
Automated HFT is made possible by the direct interaction between electronic
trading platforms and pre-programmed computers. Although this lends HFTs a
huge speed advantage over “human” traders—computers are simply much faster
at receiving, processing, and reacting to new information—the pre-programmed
systematic nature of HFT might also limit the diversity of the strategies that
HFTs implement. This notion is given empirical support by Chaboud, Chiquoine,
Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2014), who document evidence consistent with computer-
based strategies being more correlated than those of human traders in the foreign
exchange market. Possible correlation of HFT strategies is often viewed as a source
of concern, as it could potentially have destabilizing effects on the market (Haldane,
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2011, and White, 2014).
The implications of correlation among HFTs’ trading strategies is not unam-
biguous, however, and depends on the underlying reasons behind it. If the corre-
lation is a result of many HFTs focusing on the same arbitrage opportunities, this
may help improve price efficiency as implied by the models of Kondor (2009) and
Oehmke (2009) in the context of “convergence trades.” This positive effect from
competition is not a foregone conclusion, however. Stein (2009) and Kozhan and
Wah Tham (2012) both argue that increased competition for arbitrage opportuni-
ties could cause a crowding effect, which might result in prices being pushed away
from fundamentals.
Alternatively, HFT activity could be correlated because HFTs trade on common
signals. Again, the effect on prices is ambiguous. In the model of Martinez and
Rosu (2013), correlated trading by HFTs makes prices more efficient, whereas in
that of Jarrow and Protter (2012), HFTs’ simultaneity in trading causes prices
to “overshoot,” creating excess volatility. Additionally, HFTs might also create
deviations in prices from fundamentals if they follow simple trading rules like the
positive-feedback traders in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), or
the chartists in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992).
Overall, our study adds to the growing empirical literature on high-frequency
trading specifically, and algorithmic trading generally. In relation to previous work,
we contribute to the understanding of the correlation of HFT strategies across dif-
ferent firms and its potential impact on price discovery. Most previous studies
have been restricted to using aggregate measures of HFT or AT participation and
have focused more on the speed aspects of computer-based trading, and less on the
“cross-sectional” aspects.5 A concurrent study by Boehmer, Li, and Saar (2016)
5Benos and Sagade (2016), Hagstro¨mer and Norde´n (2013), and Hagstro¨mer, Norde´n, and
Zhang (2014) also make explicit use of the ability to follow individual HFT firms. Their focus
is, however, quite different from ours, and mostly on classifying and distinguishing HFTs along
market-maker and market-taker lines and assessing the aggregate impact of HFTs on market
quality. Brogaard, Hagstro¨mer, Norde´n, and Riordan (2016) study the importance of co-location
across HFT firms, and Brogaard, Garriott, and Pomeranets (2014) analyze entry and competition
among HFT firms.
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also analyzes correlations across HFTs, although their focus is very distinct from
ours. Their main finding is that increased correlation among HFT strategies is
associated with lower stock volatility and that this effect likely stems from more
efficient market making on behalf of HFTs. Their overall conclusions are thus
in line with ours, namely, that there is a fair degree of correlation among HFTs
but that this correlation appears beneficial rather than detrimental to the market.
Anand and Venkataraman (2016) study correlations among (high-frequency) mar-
ket makers on the Toronto Stock Exchange and find significant positive correlation
in the liquidity provision across different market makers. Interestingly, the correla-
tion among market makers tends to be higher when volatility is lower, alleviating
some regulatory concerns that liquidity is withdrawn en masse in stressful times.
III Data and Summary Statistics
A The ZEN Database
Our data consist of reports for trades executed on the electronic order book of the
LSE, for all stocks in the FTSE 100 index, over the four months from September 1
to December 31, 2012, a period spanning 80 business days. The transactions data
are obtained from the proprietary ZEN database.6 This database is maintained
by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and consists of trader-submitted
transaction reports, which contain information on execution price, trade size, time
stamp to the nearest second, location, and, importantly, submitter identity. The
reports also indicate if the submitter is the buyer or seller in each transaction, as
well as whether a given transaction is executed in a principal or agent capacity. We
6Our data ends on December 31, 2012, although the last trading day we use in our sample
is December 21, 2012. We drop the (two) trading days between Christmas and New Years,
as these days have an extremely low volume of trade. We focus on stocks that remained in
the FTSE 100 index throughout our sample period, and we omit shares with multiple classes
trading simultaneously on the London Stock Exchange (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell A-class and B-
class shares) due to issues in matching trades between the ZEN and Bloomberg databases for
these securities (see discussion below on matching the two databases). This leaves a total of 92
stocks in our sample, which for simplicity we refer to as the FTSE 100 sample.
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restrict our analysis to trades executed on the LSE, which accounted for between
55 and 70 percent of the total (“lit”) volume for the FTSE 100 shares during our
sample period.7
The ZEN database captures the trading activity of all firms directly regulated
by the FCA, as well as that of firms that trade through a broker; brokers are
regulated and must report their clients’ transactions. Firms that are not subject
to FCA regulation, and that do not trade through a broker, are not subject to
reporting requirements and their reports are not included in ZEN. For our purposes,
this implies that we do not observe the trades of HFTs that are direct members of
the various U.K. exchanges, but that are not FCA-regulated. This group includes
the foreign branches of HFT firms that also have a U.K. branch; i.e., the activity
of the U.K. branch is captured in ZEN, but the activity of the foreign branch is
not. Informal conversations with market regulators suggest that most firms choose
to trade on the LSE via their local branches, and we therefore do not expect
this to affect coverage in a substantial way. We also cannot identify the activity of
individual HFT desks of larger institutions—with multiple trading desks operating
in the same market—because all trades from such an institution are reported under
a single name. Similarly, it is not feasible to identify the trades of individual HFTs
that trade through a broker.
For these reasons, we focus our analysis on stand-alone HFTs that are known
to be trading on a proprietary basis. We classify trading firms as HFTs based
on discussions with FCA supervisors and from this group we select the 10 largest
firms, which account for about 98% of the total trading volume of all such identified
HFTs. For confidentiality reasons, we cannot list the names of these 10 HFTs, but
they include some of the largest stand-alone HFTs. Although the exact details
are confidential, the FCA scheme for identifying HFT firms is based on a number
of criteria such as order-submission and trade frequencies, the ratio of orders to
7In comparison, NASDAQ, from which many studies on HFTs draw their data, never ex-
ceeded 25 percent of the total S&P 500 volume over the same period (see the Fidessa Fragmen-
tation Index available at http://fragmentation.fidessa.com/fragulator/).
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executed trades, the amount of overnight positions held, the duration of limit
orders, the use of proprietary capital, as well as the utilization of latency-reducing
technologies. To be classified as an HFT, a firm would have to satisfy several of
these criteria. These criteria are also consistent with other schemes used to identify
HFTs, such as those in Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2014), Kirilenko, Kyle,
Samadi, and Tuzun (2016), and Korajczyk and Murphy (2016). The resulting data
set of HFT activity is very similar to that used by Benos and Sagade (2016).
We also use reports on proprietary trades submitted by the 10 largest invest-
ment banks (IBs) to compare and contrast the trading activity of the IBs with
that of HFTs.8 For the remainder of the paper, we refer to both HFTs and IBs as
(trading) firms.
Finally, we use quote data from the LSE, obtained via Bloomberg, to recon-
struct the top of the order book and to match the ZEN trade reports with the
prevailing best bid and ask prices at the time of a given transaction. This allows
us to classify trades as either buyer- or seller-initiated, using the usual classification
scheme of Lee and Ready (1991). That is, trades that are executed at prices closer
to the prevailing bid (ask) are classified as seller- (buyer-) initiated. Trades exe-
cuted at the quote midprice are classified based on a tick rule: uptick (downtick)
trades are classified as buyer- (seller-) initiated. We also use Bloomberg transac-
tion data to calculate the total aggregate (market-wide) volume and order flow for
each stock. The details of the matching procedure between the Bloomberg and the
Zen databases are described in Appendix A.
Importantly, as is detailed in the Appendix, we can be confident that the actual
order of trades and quotes in our merged data set is accurate. Thus, although our
transaction data are time stamped only to the nearest second, we are able to create
a complete chronological ordering of trades and quote updates. In the subsequent
VAR analysis, we make explicit use of this fact, as we estimate the model in trade
8The ZEN data contain a flag that allows us to distinguish between proprietary and agency
trades.
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time, rather than calendar time.
B Variable Definitions
We create a number of variables from the matched ZEN and Bloomberg data. Our
measure of trading volume used in the empirical analysis is the number of shares
bought or sold within a given time interval (or in a single trade), by a given HFT
or IB, in a given stock. In particular, for each firm i (HFT or IB), in stock s at
time t, we calculate V lmi,s,t, representing the sum of the number of shares bought
and sold during period t. In the summary statistics, we also present the transacted
value (in British pounds, GBP) and the number of trades.
Based on our trade classification scheme, we also measure the “aggressive” and
“passive” volume of each firm for each stock. The “aggressive” volume is the part
of the trading volume in which the firm acts as the initiator of the trade (i.e.,
the firm acts as the market-“taker”), and the “passive” volume is the part of the
trading volume in which the firm provides the quote hit by another trader (i.e.,
the firm acts as the market-“maker”). These volumes will also be referred to as
the take- and make-volumes, denoted by V lmtakei,s,t and V lm
make
i,s,t , respectively. The
sum of the aggressive and passive volumes, of course, add up to the total trading
volume of each firm.
Order flow is defined as the difference between aggressive buy-volume and ag-
gressive sell-volume, with the direction of trade viewed from the perspective of the
trade initiator (aggressor). The order flow of firm i in stock s is thus given by
OFi,s,t = V lm
take
i,s,t (Buy)− V lmtakei,s,t (Sell) , (1)
where V lmtakei,s,t (Buy) and V lm
take
i,s,t (Sell) represent the aggressive buy and sell vol-
umes, respectively.
Finally, the (change in the) net position is defined as the difference between
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overall buy volume and overall sell volume,
NPi,s,t = V lmi,s,t (Buy)− V lmi,s,t (Sell) . (2)
That is, the net position measures the direction of trade, irrespective of whether
trading is conducted through make or take orders.
Aggregate measures of volume, order flow, and net position, across HFTs or
IBs, are obtained by summing up the variables across all HFTs (IBs). That is,
V lmHFTs,t =
∑
i∈HFT
V lmi,s,t, (3)
OFHFTs,t =
∑
i∈HFT
OFi,s,t, (4)
and
NPHFTs,t =
∑
i∈HFT
NPi,s,t. (5)
V lmIBs,t , NP
IB
s,t , and OF
IB
s,t are defined analogously, as are aggregates across
other variables. The “residual” market-wide volume, net position, and order flow,
for a given stock, are defined as the sum of the respective variables across all
market participants observed in Bloomberg, except for the 10 HFTs and 10 IBs.
C Summary Statistics
We start by briefly summarizing some of the characteristics of the HFT firms in
our sample, along with the corresponding statistics for the IB firms. Summary
statistics are also shown for all “Other” firms that are not part of the 10 HFTs
and 10 IBs used in our main analysis. The “Other” category thus includes market
participants such as traditional asset managers, hedge funds, and retail investors.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for daily firm-stock characteristics, including
the daily volume (number of shares) and value (in GBP) traded, the number of
trades, trade size, the absolute change in net position over the day (measured in
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GBP), the ratio of net-position change to daily volume (based on GBP values),
and the number of times that the estimated inventory crosses zero during the day.9
Separate statistics are shown for HFTs, IBs, and “Other” firms. The first column
in each section (HFT, IB, or Other) shows the mean across all firm-stock-days.
For instance, the first row in the first column shows the average number of shares
traded across all HFTs and across all stock-day observations. The second column
shows the corresponding standard deviation across all firm-stock-days.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Table 1 shows that, on average, an HFT firm trades about 188, 000 shares and
840, 000 pounds per-stock per-day in the FTSE 100 stocks on the London Stock
Exchange. These values are distributed over approximately 145 trades per stock
during the day. There is great variation around these averages, however, as seen
by the standard deviations. IBs generally trade a bit more heavily than HFTs,
trading on average about 289, 000 shares and 1.3 million pounds per-stock per-day,
distributed over 215 trades. This is expected as IBs are larger organizations with
multiple trading desks that simultaneously execute a variety of strategies. “Other”
firms trade considerably less frequently than the large HFTs and IBs in our sample,
averaging about 47 trades per day in a given stock. However, when these firms
trade, they tend to trade much larger amounts than the HFTs and IBs (41,000
pounds versus around 5,000 pounds for HFTs and IBs).
The final three rows in Table 1 show daily statistics for the (absolute) change in
net position over the day (in GBP), the average ratio of this change to the overall
volume (in GBP), and the number of times that the inventory of the firm crosses
zero during the day.10 All three measures capture aspects of the notion that HFTs
9The inventory calculation are based on the assumption that each firm starts the day with
zero inventory for each stock.
10When calculating the averages and standard deviations of the daily ratio of position change
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take positions over short periods, are reluctant to build up inventory, and do not
follow longer-term directional strategies. As is seen, the ratio of the change in
inventory to overall traded volume is 16 percent for HFTs, 35 percent for IBs, and
43 percent for Others. The inventory of an HFT crosses zero about seven times
per day, whereas for IBs and Others, the corresponding figures are around two and
one times per day, respectively.11
IV Interactions among HFTs
We now attempt to pin down the extent of correlation, or dependency, in HFT
strategies across different HFT firms. We address this question through the use of
trade-time vector autoregressions (VARs), which capture the dependency in trad-
ing activity of HFTs within a given stock. That is, we are interested in determining
the extent to which current trading by some HFT firm might lead to, or be as-
sociated with, subsequent trading by other HFT firms. We run these regressions
in trade time (or tick time), where time is updated after each transaction in a
given security, rather than after a fixed chronological window, or calendar time.12
Trade time is arguably a better representation of how HFTs analyze information
and formulate strategies compared with clock time (Easley, de Prado, and O’Hara,
2012).
Importantly, the trade time formulation allows for a complete ordering of
events. To the extent that no trades occur exactly at the same time, the formula-
to volume, the daily observations are weighted by the number of trades on that day (for the given
firm type, i.e., HFT, IB, or Other). This ensures that days where there is more activity, and
where the daily ratio of position change to volume is better measured, are given more weight.
That is, the (daily) ratio of position change to volume is in itself best viewed as an average across
a number of trades and is therefore better measured when there is more trading activity.
11Note that the summary statistics reported here differ from those in Benos and Sagade (2016),
who use a similar data set sourced from the ZEN database, because the latter report statistics
based on trades from four trading venues (the LSE, BATS, Chi-X, and Turquoise) rather than
just the LSE. Much of the analysis in Benos and Sagade (2016) is, however, restricted to LSE-only
data.
12Trade, or event, time model formulations are also used in, for instance, Benos and Sagade
(2016) and Brogaard, Henderschott, and Riordan (2014).
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tion therefore captures the impact of a given trade on the immediately following
trades. Or, put alternatively and without claims of a causal effect, the trade time
formulation allows for capturing the immediate, or what one might term the “con-
temporaneous,” association between trading decisions. In particular, the VAR will
capture both “correlations” in trading decisions among HFTs, where the trades
of several HFTs trading on a similar signal arrive in sequence, as well as “causal”
relationships, where the trades of one HFT may trigger the trades of other HFTs.
The VAR specification is used to explore how HFTs react in response to the
actions of other HFTs, as well as IBs and the overall market, as explained in more
detail below. Formally, we perform a type of Granger causality tests, which, in line
with the discussion above, capture both contemporaneous correlations as well as
actual causality in the sense that the actions of one trading firm cause a subsequent
action by another firm. In the below discussion, we simply interpret the results in
terms of lead-lag relationships but with no claim that the effects are truly causal.
As measures of trading activity, we use three related, but distinct, variables:
order flow, total volume traded, and change-in-inventory (or equivalently, change-
in-net-position during that trade). The unit of all three trade activity measures is
number of shares traded.
A A Panel VAR of Stock Trading
Let HFTi,s,t be the trading activity of HFT firm i at trade event t in stock s, and,
analogously, let IBi,s,t be the trading activity of IB i at trade event t in stock s. As
mentioned above, trading activity is measured either by order flow, total volume, or
change-in-inventory, and t is measured in trade time. Below, we sometimes simply
refer to t as time. Further, define HFTst as the vector of stacked trading activity
in stock s at event t for all i = 1, ..., 10 HFTs and define IBst as the corresponding
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vector of IB trading activity. That is,
HFTst =

HFT1,s,t
...
HFT10,s,t
 and IBst =

IB1,s,t
...
IB10,s,t
 .
Also define M st as the residual trading activity in stock s during time t, i.e.,
the activity of the entire market less the activity of HFTs and IBs. Let Yst ≡
(HFTs′t , IB
s′
t ,M
s
t )
′
denote the stacked trading activity by both HFT and IB firms,
as well as the residual market activity, and formulate the following trade-time VAR
for stock s,
Yst = µ
s +
10∑
k=1
AkY
s
t−k + ΛX
s
t−1 + ΨGt + ε
s
t . (6)
The dependent variable, Yst ≡ (HFTs′t , IBs′t ,M st )′, is thus a 21×1 vector of trading
activity in the 10 HFT firms, the 10 IB firms, and the residual market, during time
t. The VAR therefore forms a complete system of all trading activity, represented
by the HFTs, IBs, and the “residual” market.13 µs is a 21×1 vector of stock-specific
intercepts and Ak, k = 1, ..., 10 are 21× 21 lag matrix coefficients. We include 10
lags in the VAR, corresponding to the 10 previous trades in that stock.14 Xst−1
consists of lagged control variables not modelled in the VAR. In particular, Xst−1
includes the cumulative return on stock s during the 10 trades prior to the tth ob-
13For change-in-inventory, the residual market activity is actually a linear combination of the
components of HFTst and IB
s
t , as, by construction, the net inventory change of the entire market
(
∑
iHFTi,s,t+
∑
i IBi,s,t+M
s
t ) must equal zero for each stock s during each trade t. The residual
market, Mst , thus can not be included in the VAR when trading activity is measured by changes
in inventory. The dependent variable, Yst , therefore reduces to a 20× 1 vector in this case, with
corresponding adjustments of the coefficient dimensions in the VAR.
14As a robustness check, the VAR model was also estimated with 20 lags. The coefficients
and test results for the 10-lag VAR are almost identical to those from the 20-lag VAR, indicating
that the coefficients for lags 11-20 are mostly indistinguishable from zero. This is also further
confirmed by the plots in Figures 1 and 2, which graph coefficients across lags. As is seen, in
most cases, by lag 10 the coefficients are very close to zero. In the interest of space, the results
for the 20-lag VAR are not reported.
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servation, the realized volatility during the 10 trades prior to the tth observation,15
and the average spread and depth at the best bid and offer in stock s during the 10
trades prior to the tth observation.16 Gt includes deterministic functions of time.
In particular, Gt represents linear and quadratic functions of the daily observation
number (ranging from 1 to 80) and intra-day dummy variables for each distinct
half-hour period within the trading day (i.e., 8:00AM-8:30AM, 8:31AM-9:00AM,
and so forth).
The VAR is estimated by pooling data across the full sample of FTSE 100
stocks, allowing for stock-specific intercepts in each equation (µs). All other co-
efficients are pooled across stocks. In total, there are 25,230,628 observations
(trades) in the pooled regression, stretching across the 80-day sample period be-
tween September 1 and December 31, 2012. Data are sampled during the normal
trading hours between 8:00AM and 4:30PM, although activity in the first and last
five minutes of each trading day is discarded in order to avoid any beginning or end
of day effects. Standard errors and parameter covariance matrices are computed
using a non-parametric block bootstrap at the daily level. This method (described
in detail in Appendix B) produces consistent estimates of standard errors that are
robust to heteroskedasticity as well as any error dependency within each trading
day. In particular, the bootstrap approach is robust to cross-sectional dependence
across stocks in the panel VAR.
In this framework, we are interested in testing the following hypotheses: (i)
To what extent does trading by an HFT firm in a given stock lead to (Granger
cause) subsequent trading activity by other HFTs in the same stock? (ii) To what
extent does trading by an HFT firm in a given stock lead to subsequent trading
activity by other market participants in the same stock? (iii) Do we observe similar
relationships within and between HFTs and IBs, viewing these two types of traders
15Realized volatility is defined as the sum of squared mid-quote returns.
16The variables in Xst−1 are all measured up until one period prior to the current observation;
hence the subscript t − 1. For instance, the past returns on stock s are defined as the returns
over the t− 10th period to the t− 1th period.
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as distinct groups? We attempt to test these hypotheses within the above VAR
model by mapping the general questions into specific coefficient restrictions. To
facilitate the testing of these hypotheses, it is useful to write the VAR in a format
where Yst is written out explicitly. That is, partitioning the coefficient matrices,
we can write equation (6) as

HFTst
IBst
M st
 = µs +
10∑
k=1

A11,k A12,k A13,k
A21,k A22,k A23,k
A31,k A32,k A33,k


HFTst−k
IBst−k
M st−k
+ ΛXst−1 + ΨGt + st .
(7)
In equation (7), the parameter sub-matrices (Aij,k) , i, j = 1, ..., 3, now group
the coefficients for the HFTs, IBs, and the residual market. A11,k (A22,k) correspond
to lag-dependencies among HFTs (IBs). The sub-matrix A12,k (A21,k) captures the
effects of past trading by IBs (HFTs) on the current trading of HFTs (IBs), while
the sub-matrix A31,k (A32,k) corresponds to the effect of HFTs (IBs) on residual
market trading activity. A13,k (A23,k) corresponds to the lag-effects of residual
market activity on HFTs (IBs).
To test whether lagged trading in other HFTs affects (Granger causes) a given
HFT’s current trading, we evaluate the null hypothesis that the sum of the off-
diagonal coefficients in A11,k across all k lags is equal to zero. Similarly, we test
whether past trading by IBs affects current trading of HFTs by evaluating the
null hypothesis that the sum of all the coefficients across all lags in A12,k is equal
to zero. In both cases, the null of no Granger causation is rejected if the sum is
statistically significantly different from zero. Analogous tests are used to evaluate
how a given IB’s trading responds to lagged trading by other IBs and lagged HFT
trading. The sum of the coefficients on the lags of a given variable is proportional
to the long-run impact of that variable, and the test can essentially be viewed as
a form of long-run Granger causality test. Importantly, to the extent that the
relationship is significant, the sign of the sum also indicates the direction of the
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(long-run) relationship; i.e., whether current trading leads to more or less trading
in the future.
For the order flow and total volume specifications, we can also test how lagged
trading of HFTs or IBs affects trading by the remainder of market participants.
Specifically, we can test if increased trading activity of HFTs (IBs) leads to in-
creased trading activity by the remaining firms in the market by testing the null
that the sum of the elements of A31,k (A32,k) are equal to zero. For completeness,
we also test whether increased market activity affects HFTs (IBs) by considering
the sum of the elements of A13,k (A23,k). Again, the null of no causation is rejected
if the sum of these parameters is statistically significantly different from zero.17
B Empirical Results
Table 2 provides the full list of hypotheses that we evaluate, along with the for-
mal coefficient restrictions corresponding to each hypothesis. Results are shown
for trading activity measured as order flow, total trading volume, and change-in-
inventory. In each case, the total sum of all the coefficients is given, along with
the bootstrapped p-value corresponding to the Wald test of the null hypothesis
that the sum is equal to zero, which might be interpreted as a null hypothesis of
no (long-run) Granger causality. As mentioned above, the p-values are obtained
through a bootstrap procedure, which controls for heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence between stocks (see Appendix B for details).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Starting with the results for order flow, the first row of Table 2 shows strong
statistical evidence that current trading in a given stock by a given HFT firm is
17As explained in footnote 13, it is not possible to include residual market activity in the
specification with changes in net positions.
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affected by the past trading in that stock by other HFT firms. In particular, the
order flow results suggest that, on average, the current trading of an HFT will
tend to be in the same direction as that of the past trades of other HFTs (the sum
of the order flow coefficients is positive). In contrast, the second row of Table 2
indicates that the current trading direction of a given IB is little affected by the
past trades of other IBs. The estimated effect is not significant at the 5 percent
level (the p-value is 0.08) and very small in magnitude. Consistent with these
findings, row 3 shows that the null hypothesis that the lag effects are identical for
HFTs and IBs is strongly rejected.
Rows four to six of Table 2 show that the impact of past HFT order flow on
current IB trading is almost identical to the analogous impact of past IB order
flow on current HFT activity. In addition, as seen in rows 7 through 9 of Table 2,
current trading by the remainder of the market (residual trading) reacts strongly
to previous order flows of both HFTs and IBs, although somewhat less to past HFT
flows than past IB flows. The final three rows in Table 2 show that neither IBs nor
HFTs react much to previous trading by the rest of the market; the coefficients
are statistically significant but very small in absolute magnitude.
For order flow, the lead-lag relationship between IBs and HFTs, viewed as two
trader groups, is fairly symmetric, with IBs and HFTs each responding similarly to
the other group’s past trading. Thus, HFTs do not lead the trading of IBs to any
greater extent than IBs lead the trading of HFTs. Past HFT and IB order flows
also tend to lead the rest of the market in a similar way, with, in fact, IBs having a
somewhat stronger effect. Hirschey (2016) and Tong (2015) both argue that HFTs
anticipate the orders of other investors, whereas van Kervel and Menkveld (2015)
find evidence to the contrary. Our findings mostly concern the relative aspects of
HFTs and IBs, suggesting that in terms of lead-lag relationships with each other
and with the rest of the market, HFTs and IBs are quite similar.
Figures 1 and 2 graphically display some of the relationships emerging from
the VAR model, on a lag-by-lag basis. In particular, Figure 1 shows the total
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response of HFTs (IBs) to the trading activity of other HFTs (IBs). Figure 2
shows the corresponding responses of HFTs to IB trading, and vice versa. That is,
Figures 1 and 2 show the coefficients reported in Table 2 broken down by each lag.18
[INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2 HERE]
The graphs tell essentially the same story as the coefficients and test results re-
ported in Table 2. However, breaking down the effects lag-by-lag provides a better
idea of how the lead-lag relationships evolve over time. As evident from Graph
A in both Figures 1 and 2, which show the order flow results, the majority of
the effects are concentrated in the first few lags. Higher-order lag coefficients are
typically close to zero and/or not statistically significant (the vertical bars around
each lag coefficient indicate 95 percent confidence intervals).
The lag coefficients reported in Figures 1 and 2 also have simple economic
interpretations. In particular, each reported coefficient represents the total effect
on current trading by all HFT or IB firms from a 100-share trade by each firm in
the lagged period. For instance, in the left-hand-side chart of Graph A in Figure
1, the first lag coefficient is around 50. This implies that if each HFT traded
100 shares in the previous period, the current aggregate HFT trading increases
by 50 shares, ignoring any effects coming from own past trading by a given HFT.
Analogous interpretations apply to the other graphs in Figures 1 and 2.
The results for volume, which are shown in the middle two columns of Table 2,
are broadly in line with those obtained using order flow. Total trading volume is
not associated with a given direction of trade, and these regressions thus provide
a measure of how overall trading activity, rather than trading direction, is related
for HFTs, IBs, and the rest of the market. Past trading volume by other HFTs
predicts a larger current trading volume for a given HFT (row 1) and for a given
18The coefficient estimates shown in Table 2 are thus obtained by summing up the coefficients
across all lags in the corresponding graph in Figure 1 or 2 (and dividing by 100).
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IB (row 5). Past trading volume by IBs does not predict a larger current volume
for other IBs (row 2), but past IB trading is predictive of future HFT trading (row
4). In contrast to the order flow results, past HFT trading volume does not have a
significant impact on the current trading volume by the remainder of the market
(row 7), whereas past IB volume is still significant (row 8). Formally, however,
we cannot reject that these effects on the remainder of the market are the same
for HFTs and IBs (row 9). Graph B in Figures 1 and 2 show the volume results
broken down by each lag. In comparison to the order flow results, shown in Graph
A in the figures, there is a tendency for the volume effects to be less concentrated
to the first few lags. In the case of the response of IB trading to previous trading
by other IBs (seen in Figure 1), there is also evidence of an initial negative effect,
which is subsequently reversed.
The results for change-in-inventory, or net position, are shown in the final two
columns of Table 2 and provide some additional information regarding the interac-
tions among HFTs and IBs. Because change-in-inventory captures both aggressive
and passive trading, these regressions highlight the degree to which firms are actu-
ally trading with each other (i.e., taking opposite positions over a series of trades).
For HFTs, we find that changes in inventory are positively related over time, or, in
other words, HFTs tend to accumulate or reduce inventory in a given stock at the
same time (row 1). In contrast, for IBs we find that changes in inventory are neg-
atively related and that these firms therefore tend to absorb inventory from each
other (row 2). We also find that past HFT inventory accumulation (reduction) is
associated with reduction (accumulation) in IB inventory, providing further evi-
dence that HFTs do not appear to front-run IBs (row 5). Graph C in Figures 1 and
2 shows the lag-by-lag results. These highlight, in particular, the strong negative
lag effect for IBs (Figure 1), which persists over many lags. As mentioned previ-
ously (see footnote 13), the residual market-wide change-in-inventory is a linear
combination of the change-in-inventory of the HFTs and IBs. As such, we cannot
include the M st variable in the panel-VAR for this measure of trading activity.
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These change-in-inventory results might also help explain, or further elaborate
on, some recent findings by Korajczyk and Murphy (2016) and van Kervel and
Menkveld (2015). The essential finding in both of these studies is that when large
traders begin a sequence of trades (i.e., a split-up of a large buy or sell order),
HFTs initially act as liquidity providers by trading in the opposite direction of the
large trade. However, after a while (around 15 minutes in Korajczyk and Murphy
and 2 hours in van Kervel and Menkveld), the HFTs learn of the trade sequence
and instead start trading in the same direction as the large trader. This switch in
trade direction by HFTs leads to substantially higher trading costs during this part
of the trade. If HFTs all tend to trade in the same direction, it suggests that it
might be hard to find a (market making) HFT to accommodate your trade if your
trade is in the “wrong” direction. That is, liquidity would either be plentiful, as
all HFTs are willing to trade with you, or dry up, as they all want to trade in the
same direction as you. This could explain the rather drastic increase in execution
costs as HFTs switch direction a bit into a large order. IBs, on the other hand,
have less of a systematic direction as a group.
In summary, the VAR results suggest that the lead-lag dependencies in trading
activity between HFT firms appear to be considerably stronger and more significant
than for IB firms. This is true when activity is measured either by order flow or
overall volume. When looking at changes in inventory, we find that HFTs tend
to be positively related, whereas IBs are strongly negatively related. HFTs thus
have a tendency to act coherently as a group, jointly building up or decreasing
their overall position in a stock. IBs on the other hand, appear to trade more with
each other, such that a decrease in net position for some firm is associated with a
subsequent increase by another firm. These results are also consistent with those
of Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2014), who find that HFTs (or
ATs more generally) tend to trade relatively less with each other in the foreign
exchange market.
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V Price Impact of Correlated HFTs
Given the evidence on correlated trading activity among HFTs, we continue the
analysis with a look at the actual impact of correlated trading on stock prices. The
potential impact of such behaviour on market prices has been a concern among
authorities (e.g., Haldane, 2011). Simultaneous HFT activity in the same stock
and in the same direction could potentially have an excessively large price impact,
causing prices to temporarily deviate from fundamentals. Therefore, in this section,
we directly examine if instances of highly correlated trading within stocks have any
predictive power for contemporaneous and future returns and whether the impact
of correlated trading by HFTs is any different from that of correlated trading by
IBs.
To capture the extent of correlated trading by HFTs and IBs, we construct
a metric similar to the one used by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) to
measure herding among institutional investors. In particular, for each stock s and
time interval t we calculate
CorrTradingHFTs,t = N (Buy)
HFT
s,t −
N (Buy)HFTs,t +N (Sell)
HFT
s,t
2
, (8)
where N (Buy)HFTs,t is the number of aggressive HFT buyers and N (Sell)
HFT
s,t is the
number of aggressive HFT sellers in stock s in time period t. In a given stock, over
a given time interval, an HFT is classified as an aggressive buyer (seller) if its total
aggressive buy volume is greater (smaller) than its total aggressive sell volume in
that stock during that time interval. That is, if the majority of the HFT’s “take”-
volume is on the buy (sell) side, it is classified as an aggressive buyer (seller). An
HFT that performs no aggressive trading—or if its aggressive buy and sell volumes
are identical—in a given stock in a given time interval adds neither to the number
of aggressive buyers nor sellers in that time period.
The metric defined in equation (8) effectively calculates the number of excess
aggressive buyers or sellers at any given time, relative to a situation where HFTs
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randomly buy and sell with equal probability, independently of one another. When
all 10 HFTs in our sample aggressively buy, this metric takes a value of +5, whereas
when all 10 HFTs aggressively sell at the same time, the metric takes the value of
−5. When aggressive HFTs are equally split between buyers and sellers, or if no
HFTs are trading aggressively at all, the metric equals zero. An analogous metric
is also constructed for IBs, denoted by CorrTradingIBs,t .
The correlation metrics, CorrTradingHFTs,t and CorrTrading
IB
s,t , are calculated
for all stocks in the sample of FTSE 100 shares using minute-by-minute data. The
one-minute sampling frequency is motivated by the need to sample coarsely enough
for there to be sufficiently many observations where numerous HFTs (and/or IBs)
trade during the same time interval. That is, the higher the sampling frequency,
the more likely it is that just one, or very few, HFT(s) trade in a given time
interval, rendering the above correlation metric less useful.19 At the same time,
the sampling frequency still needs to be high enough to capture the relevant time
horizons over which HFTs operate. As a robustness check, we also present results
for data sampled at the five-minute frequency.
To measure the contemporaneous and lagged price impact associated with cor-
related trading, we regress one-minute returns on contemporaneous and lagged
order flows, the correlated trading metrics and their lags, as well as interactions
of the two. Because both order flows and the correlated trading metrics can take
on both positive and negative values, a negative order flow and a negative trade
correlation would result in a positive interaction term. To avoid this canceling
out of signs, the order flows are instead interacted with the absolute values of the
19Clearly, one could not conduct this analysis with tick-by-tick observations, as in the VAR
model, since then one would end up with just one trade in a given time period.
24
trade-correlation metrics. Thus, our full specification takes the form
Rs,t = αs +
5∑
i=0
βHFTOF,i OF
HFT
s,t−i +
5∑
i=0
βIBOF,iOF
IB
s,t−i +
5∑
i=1
βResOF,iOF
Res
s,t−i
+
5∑
i=0
βHFTCorr,iCorrTrading
HFT
s,t−i +
5∑
i=0
βIBCorr,iCorrTrading
IB
s,t−i
+
5∑
i=0
βHFT|Corr|,i|CorrTrading|HFTs,t−i +
5∑
i=0
βIB|Corr|,i|CorrTrading|IBs,t−i
+
5∑
i=0
βHFTOF×|Corr|,i
(
OFHFTs,t−i × |CorrTrading|HFTs,t−i
)
+
5∑
i=0
βIBOF×|Corr|,i
(
OF IBs,t−i × |CorrTrading|IBs,t−i
)
+ us,t. (9)
Here Rs,t is the one-minute return of stock s in period t, and OF
HFT
s,t , OF
IB
s,t , and
OFRess,t are the order flows from HFTs, IBs, and the remainder of the market (the
“residual” order flow). CorrTradingHFTs,t and CorrTrading
IB
s,t are the correlation
metrics for HFTs and IBs defined in equation (8). To ensure that the interaction
terms do indeed capture the interacting effects between order flows and absolute
trade correlations, the absolute trade-correlation metrics also enter into the regres-
sion separately.
The main coefficients of interest in equation (9) are those in front of the HFT
and IB trade-correlation metrics. In particular, we are interested in whether cor-
related trading among HFTs (or IBs) is associated with an “extra” price impact,
over and above the price impact of order flow, and whether that additional price
impact is subsequently reversed or not. That is, keeping HFT order flow constant,
does shifting the degree of trade correlation among HFTs alter the overall price
impact? The coefficient on the HFT trade-correlation metric, controlling for order
flow, answers this question.20
20The coefficients on the interactions between order flows and the (absolute) trade-correlation
metrics measures whether this “extra” price impact becomes more or less pronounced in periods
when order flow is large.
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The model is estimated by least squares, pooling the data across all stocks while
allowing for stock-specific intercepts αs, and including five lags of all variables. To
achieve comparability across stocks, we normalize the order flow variables at the
stock level by the standard deviation of the total order flow for that stock (i.e.,
the sum of the HFT, IB, and Residual order flows). The returns on the left-hand
side of the regressions are standardized by their own standard deviation at the
stock level.21 Prior to being interacted, the order flows and the absolute correlated
trading metrics are de-meaned (at the stock level) such that the main coefficients
in all regressions are reported at the sample mean and thus are comparable across
the specifications with and without the interaction terms. That is, the total effect
of HFT (IB) order flow, evaluated at the sample mean of (absolute) correlated
trading, is therefore simply given by the coefficient on the HFT (IB) order flow,
enabling a direct comparison of the order flow coefficients in the specifications with
and without interaction terms. As stock-specific intercepts (i.e., fixed effects) are
included in the regressions, this demeaning does not in any way alter the regression
specifications, but merely allows for an easier interpretation of the coefficients.
Summary statistics of the (non-standardized) returns, order flow, and trade-
correlation variables are presented in Table 3, along with the correlation matrix
for these variables. The correlations between order flows and the trade-correlation
metrics are around 0.25 for both HFTs and IBs. Thus, although positively related,
the order flows and trade-correlation metrics are clearly distinct activity measures.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 4 reports the regression results. For brevity, we only report the sum of
the coefficients for the five lags and the associated (robust) t-statistics. In column
1, we first run a simple regression of one-minute returns on contemporaneous and
21The correlation metrics, CorrTradingHFTs,t and CorrTrading
IB
s,t , are not scaled prior to
estimation since they are already in a standardized format, taking on values between +5 and -5.
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lagged total order flow; the total order flow is denoted by OF Tots,t in the table, and is
defined as OF Tots,t ≡ OFHFTs,t +OF IBs,t +OFRess,t .22 Consistent with previous findings
in the literature, the contemporaneous coefficient is positive and highly statisti-
cally significant. The sum of the coefficients for the lagged order flow is negative
and also significant, implying that part of the contemporaneous price impact tends
to be subsequently reversed.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
In column 2 of Table 4, HFT, IB, and residual order flows enter separately into the
regression. The results are qualitatively the same as in the specification with total
order flow. That is, there is positive contemporaneous correlation between order
flow and returns and negative correlation between past order flow and returns,
uniformly across HFTs, IBs, and the rest of the market.
We next add our metrics of correlated trading to the regressions. The esti-
mation results are reported in column 3 of Table 4. The contemporaneous price
impact coefficients for HFTs’ and IBs’ correlated trading are both positive and
significant, although the IB coefficient is larger in magnitude. Most importantly,
however, the coefficient on the lagged trade-correlation metric for HFTs is positive
(and small in magnitude), whereas the coefficient on lagged trade correlation for
IBs is negative (and large in magnitude). That is, keeping order flow fixed, the
impact of HFTs’ correlated trading is not subsequently reversed, unlike for IBs.
Put differently, the results show that correlated HFT trading mitigates the reversal
effect of lagged order flow, whereas correlated IB trading exacerbates the reversal
effect. These observed differences in the point estimates for HFTs and IBs are also
statistically significant, as evident from the formal Wald tests reported toward the
bottom of the table. The regression results thus suggest that HFTs’ correlated
22This regression can viewed as a restricted version of equation (9), where one imposes the
restrictions βHFTOF,i = β
IB
OF,i = β
Res
OF,i for i = 0, ...5, and all other coefficients are restricted to equal
zero.
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trading is informed, leading to a permanent price impact.
Finally, the interactions between the order flows and the absolute values of the
correlated trading metrics are included in the regression. The results are reported
in column 4 of Table 4. The contemporaneous interaction terms are negative and
statistically significant for both HFTs and IBs, indicating that a shift in trade
correlation has a larger effect when order flow is closer to its mean.23 The lagged
interactions are negative for HFTs and positive for IBs, although the estimated
coefficients are fairly small in magnitude. The coefficients for the (non-interacted)
trade-correlation metrics remain virtually identical after including the interaction
terms, and inclusion of the interactions does not alter the main conclusions.
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of the estimated effects, recall first
that the returns on the left-hand side of the regression are standardized to have a
unit standard deviation. The normalized HFT order flow has a standard deviation
of around 0.5,24 and a one-standard-deviation HFT order flow shock is thus asso-
ciated with a 0.2-standard-deviation shock to returns (βHFTOF,0 × 0.5 ≈ 0.4 × 0.5),
keeping all else constant. A unit shift in the HFT trade-correlation metric would
similarly lead to a 0.2-standard-deviation move in returns (βHFTCorr,0 ≈ 0.2). Most
interestingly, perhaps, the final specification in column 4 of Table 4 shows that
the effect of correlated trading might “cancel out” the reversal effect of past order
flow, such that the overall effect on returns of past order imbalances and corre-
lated trading is positive, highlighting the likely informed nature of correlated HFT
trading.25
23For a given value of HFT order flow, the impact of a unit increase in HFT trade correlation
is given by βHFTCorr,0 + β
HFT
|Corr|,0 + β
HFT
OF×|Corr|,0 × OFHFTs,t ≈ 0.2 − 0.07 × OFHFTs,t , where OFHFTs,t
is measured in deviations from the mean. The total effect evaluated at the mean of HFT order
flow is thus simply equal to 0.2. If HFT order flow is above the mean, the total impact clearly
decreases. The same reasoning would apply to a negative shift in trade correlation, provided that
order flow in that case is also assumed to be below its mean.
24The HFT, IB, and residual order flows are normalized by the standard deviation of the total
order flow for each stock. Each of these normalized order flows will therefore have a standard
deviation less than unity.
25Keeping all else constant, the estimated total price impact of a unit shock to lagged cor-
related HFT trading and a 1-standard-deviation (≈ 0.5) shock to lagged HFT order flow, is
given by −0.023OFHFTs,t−1 + 0.026CorrTradingHFTs,t−1 + 0.010|CorrTrading|HFTs,t−1− 0.036(OFHFTs,t−1 ×
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As a robustness check, we also estimate the same regressions as above using
data sampled every five minutes. That is, five-minute returns are now regressed
on the order flow and trade-correlation variables constructed over five-minute in-
tervals. However, in order to keep the temporal span of the lags identical to the
one-minute specification, only one lag is now included. Otherwise, the two spec-
ifications are identical, and the results are presented in Table 5. The results in
Table 5 strongly echo those seen in Table 4. The statistical significance of some
of the estimates based on the five-minute data is somewhat weaker than in the
one-minute case, but otherwise the results are consistent across the two sampling
frequencies. Importantly, there is no evidence that HFTs’ correlated trading leads
to price reversals.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Overall, these results suggest that HFTs’ correlated trading is likely the result
of HFTs trading on the same “correct” information. In contrast, the correlated
trading of IBs is associated with price reversals, suggesting that the correlation
in IB strategies is less informationally driven. Previous studies, including Carrion
(2013) and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014), have also documented
that HFTs tend to contribute to price efficiency by trading (aggressively) in the
direction of permanent price changes and in the opposite direction of transitory
price changes. Such findings are consistent with HFTs acting as informed traders
(e.g., Kyle, 1985). Our results add to these previous findings by showing that
periods when the trading activity of HFTs is correlated tend to be periods when
HFTs possess private information, i.e., act as informed traders. The correlation
in trading activity would thus appear to be the result of correlations in “private”
information. The findings here also contribute to the view that the private infor-
mation held by HFTs appears to be relevant over horizons that stretch for at least
|CorrTrading|HFTs,t−1) = −0.023× 0.5 + 0.026 + 0.01− 0.036× 0.5 = 0.0065.
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a few minutes, and not just over shorter intervals of a few seconds.26
VI Conclusion
Using a unique data set of the transactions of individual high-frequency traders
(HFTs), we examine the interactions between different HFTs and the impact of
such interactions on price discovery. Our main results show that for trading in a
given stock, HFT firms’ trading activities are positively related at high frequencies.
This is true both for overall trading volume, as well as for directional measures
of trading such as order flow and changes in net position. In contrast, when
performing the same analysis for a group of investment banks, we find that order
flow is much more weakly related across the banks, whereas changes in net positions
are, in fact, strongly negatively related. The results for net positions, in particular,
highlight that HFT firms have a tendency to all trade in the same direction at the
time, whereas investment banks instead tend to trade more disparately and absorb
each others’ changes in inventory.
Given the apparent tendency to commonality in trading activity and trading
direction among HFTs, we further examine whether periods of high HFT cor-
relation are associated with price impacts that are subsequently reversed. Such
reversals might be interpreted as evidence of high trade correlations leading to
short-term price dislocations and excess volatility. However, we find that instances
of correlated trading among HFTs are associated with a permanent price impact,
whereas instances of correlated bank trading are, in fact, associated with future
price reversals. We view this as evidence that the commonality of order flows in
the cross section of HFTs is the result of HFTs’ trades being informed, and as such
have the same sign at approximately the same time. In other words, HFTs appear
26Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) document that HFTs appear able to predict
price movements over the next few seconds, whereas Carrion (2013) find that HFTs also appear
to have the ability to time the market over longer (greater than five minutes) intra-daily intervals.
In conjunction with our results, this suggests that HFTs likely possess the ability to time the
market at a range of different intra-daily horizons.
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to be collectively buying and selling at the “right” time, and correlations in their
trading activity appear to, at least partly, be driven by correlations in their private
information signals.
In summary, our study finds strong support for the notion that the strategies of
HFT firms tend to be correlated with each other. However, our results also suggest
that such correlations are not destabilizing for the market, but rather reflect HFT
firms trading on the same (correct) information.
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Appendix A. Matching the ZEN and Bloomberg
data
The Bloomberg data set is time stamped to the nearest second and contains both
trade and quote information. In addition to the one-second time stamp, these data
also contain a variable indicating the chronological order of all events of either kind
(trades or quote changes). We can therefore exactly match the trade and quote
information within the Bloomberg data set, creating an exactly ordered trade and
quote data set.
The trade data in ZEN and Bloomberg are subsequently matched on multiple
criteria (execution price, trade size, as well as time to the nearest second) using the
fact that we also observe trade information in Bloomberg. By matching on time
stamp, as well as trade size and execution price, we are able to almost perfectly
match the Bloomberg trades (and, by implication, the Bloomberg quotes) to the
ZEN trade information, with an excess of 99% definitive matches for the trades in
ZEN. The remaining less than 1 percent of trades that could not be matched are
dropped from the analysis.
Since the Bloomberg data provide a correct chronological ordering of both the
trades and the quotes, we can also be confident that the actual order of trades and
quotes in our final merged data set is accurate. Thus, although our transaction
data are time stamped only to the nearest second, we are able to create an exact
ordering of the trades.
Our matching scheme therefore also alleviates most of the concerns raised in
the literature on accurately matching trades and quotes in order to classify trade
direction (e.g., Easley, Lopez de Prado, and O’Hara, 2012, Chakrabarty, Pascual,
and Shkilko, 2014, and Holden and Jacobsen, 2014). This is typically a problem
in many data sets because trades and quotes observed at coarse time intervals are
either not individually sequenced or not sequenced against each other (i.e., trades
versus quotes) within each time interval. Our procedure still suffers from limita-
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tions in the Lee and Ready trade signing algorithm, but most studies suggest that
this approach works very well provided quotes and trades are correctly matched
(e.g., Carrion and Kolay, 2014).
Appendix B. The Bootstrap Procedure
Standard errors and parameter covariance matrices for the VAR in Section A are
computed using a non-parametric non-overlapping block bootstrap, where blocks
are defined by trading days in our sample. This method re-samples with replace-
ment from the 80 trading days in our data and constructs a bootstrap sample
containing all trades from the re-sampled days for each bootstrap run, b = 1, ..., B.
For each bootstrapped run, b, we construct the data matrices
{
Ys,bt ,X
s,b
t−1,G
b
t
}
for
each stock s and then estimate the pooled parameters
{
Ab1, ..., A
b
10,Λ
b,Ψb
}
and the
stock-specific intercepts
{
µs,b
}
. From the B bootstrapped parameter estimates, we
directly estimate the covariance matrix of the parameters of the VARs. These co-
variance matrices are used for the hypothesis tests in Table 2. We set B equal
to 100 for each regression. This number of replications is chosen for reasons of
computational feasibility.
This method of estimating parameter standard errors and covariances has a
number of advantages. First and most important, these estimates are robust to
both arbitrary heteroskedasticity as well as arbitrary error correlations within a
given trading day. In other words, we treat any error terms within a trading day
as potentially dependent and compute standard errors that are robust to both
these issues (the bootstrap is robust to heteroskedasticity, regardless of the block
structure). While the lag structure of the VAR should account for serial correlation
in the error terms of each equation, it is still possible that the error terms across
stocks are correlated for trades occurring relatively close to one another in time.
Second, the non-parametric bootstrap is based on less restrictive assumptions than
alternatives such as the parametric bootstrap (Hall, 2005) or usual parametric
33
VAR standard errors. Third, the nature of exchange trading, whereby continuous
trading occurs for only 8.5 hours of each day before ceasing for the next 15.5
hours, imparts a natural block structure for the dependence in our data that we
directly model; error terms within blocks (trades on the same days) are plausibly
correlated while error terms across blocks (i.e., trades occurring on separate days)
are plausibly independent. Lastly, the number of blocks naturally increases with
the data, a requirement for consistency (Kreiss and Lahiri, 2012).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics.
The table reports means and standard deviations of various measures of trade
activity for HFTs, IBs, and all “Other” firm activity based on data pooled
across firm-stock-days. The means and standard deviations are calculated over
all firm-stock-days with at least one trade. The sample includes all limit order
book trades in FTSE 100 stocks on the LSE from September 1 to December
31, 2012. Specifically, the summary statistics are based on data for the 92
stocks that remained in the FTSE 100 index throughout the sample period and
that did not trade with multiple classes simultaneously on the London Stock
Exchange.
HFT IB Other
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Volume (Shares ’000) 188.13 1,108.36 288.70 976.94 122.23 1,016.99
Volume (GBP ’000) 842.5 1,790.2 1,344.5 2,393.5 482.6 2,543.2
Number of trades per day 145.4 251.0 215.3 323.7 47.1 198.0
Trade size (GBP) 5,455 7,207 5,527 5,297 41,311 651,667
Absolute daily position change (GBP ’000) 133.3 349.6 455.6 917.2 198.9 1,269.4
Ratio of absolute position change to volume (GBP/GBP) 0.16 0.23 0.35 0.27 0.43 0.36
Zero-inventory crossings per day 7.28 17.52 2.21 2.90 1.29 24.97
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Table 4: Price Impact Regressions using one-minute data.
The table shows regressions of returns on contemporaneous and lagged order
flows, correlated trading metrics, absolute correlated trading metrics, and inter-
actions of order flows and the absolute correlated trading metrics. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The regressions are
estimated by least squares, pooling the data across all stocks while allowing for
stock-specific intercepts. The order flow variables are normalized, at the stock
level, by the standard deviation of the total order flow for that stock, and the
returns on the left-hand side of the regressions are normalized by their own
standard deviation at the stock level. Prior to being interacted, the order flows
and the absolute correlated trading metrics are also de-meaned, such that the
main coefficients in all regressions are reported at the sample mean. The results
are based on data using all limit order book trades in FTSE 100 stocks on the
LSE from September 1 to December 31, 2012. Specifically, the analysis uses
data for the 92 stocks that remained in the FTSE 100 index throughout the
sample period and that did not trade with multiple classes simultaneously on
the London Stock Exchange. In total, there are 3,311,540 one-minute observa-
tions. The t-statistics and Wald tests are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and
cross-sectional dependence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OF Tott 0.472
(183.8)
OF Tott−1,t−5 -0.067
(-34.72)
OFHFTt 0.439 0.351 0.378
(149.8) (126.4) (107.2)
OFHFTt−1,t−5 -0.039 -0.040 -0.023
(-11.71) (-11.31) (-5.310)
OF IBt 0.473 0.384 0.410
(179.6) (190.1) (159.6)
OF IBt−1,t−5 -0.075 -0.046 -0.046
(-37.86) (-21.03) (-16.74)
OFRESt 0.519 0.466 0.457
(156.9) (157.1) (155.9)
OFRESt−1,t−5 -0.071 -0.058 -0.058
(-28.57) (-23.98) (-23.94)
CorrTradingHFTt 0.186 0.203
(45.72) (47.23)
CorrTradingHFTt−1,t−5 0.017 0.026
(3.024) (4.389)
CorrTradingIBt 0.310 0.324
(85.08) (83.93)
CorrTradingIBt−1,t−5 -0.154 -0.155
(-48.42) (-48.99)
|CorrTrading|HFTt 0.002
(0.520)
|CorrTrading|HFTt−1,t−5 0.010
(1.511)
|CorrTrading|IBt -0.003
(-1.064)
|CorrTrading|IBt−1,t−5 -0.010
(-2.689)
OFHFTt × |CorrTrading|HFTt -0.071
(-12.90)
OFHFTt−1,t−5 × |CorrTrading|HFTt−1,t−5 -0.036
(-5.465)
OF IBt × |CorrTrading|IBt -0.046
(-15.64)
OF IBt−1,t−5 × |CorrTrading|IBt−1,t−5 0.002
(0.625)
Wald test H0 : β
HFT
Corr,0 = β
IB
Corr,0 (p-values) 0.000 0.000
Wald test H0 :
∑5
i=1 β
HFT
Corr,i =
∑5
i=1 β
IB
Corr,i (p-values) 0.000 0.000
Table 5: Price Impact Regressions using five-minute data.
The table shows regressions of returns on contemporaneous and lagged order
flows, correlated trading metrics, absolute correlated trading metrics, and inter-
actions of order flows and the absolute correlated trading metrics. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The regressions are
estimated by least squares, pooling the data across all stocks while allowing
for stock-specific intercepts. The order flow variables are normalized, at the
stock level, by the standard deviation of the total order flow for that stock,
and the returns on the left-hand side of the regressions are normalized by their
own standard deviation at the stock level. Prior to being interacted, the order
flows and the absolute correlated trading metrics are also de-meaned, such that
the main coefficients in all regressions are reported at the sample mean. The
results are based on data using all limit order book trades in FTSE 100 stocks
on the LSE from September 1 to December 31, 2012. Specifically, the analysis
uses data for the 92 stocks that remained in the FTSE 100 index throughout
the sample period and that did not trade with multiple classes simultaneously
on the London Stock Exchange. In total, there are 662,308 five-minute obser-
vations. The t-statistics and Wald tests are based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998)
standard errors, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and
cross-sectional dependence.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OF Tott 0.428
(118.9)
OF Tott−1,t−5 -0.052
(-26.11)
OFHFTt 0.311 0.261 0.276
(39.89) (29.24) (28.21)
OFHFTt−1,t−5 -0.044 -0.049 -0.053
(-10.77) (-11.30) (-10.39)
OF IBt 0.462 0.394 0.431
(96.37) (86.95) (79.53)
OF IBt−1,t−5 -0.063 -0.057 -0.062
(-25.01) (-21.18) (-18.18)
OFRESt 0.429 0.389 0.385
(85.34) (85.60) (84.80)
OFRESt−1,t−5 -0.056 -0.053 -0.052
(-19.95) (-19.58) (-19.38)
CorrTradingHFTt 0.047 0.054
(8.647) (9.849)
CorrTradingHFTt−1,t−5 0.010 0.007
(2.813) (1.994)
CorrTradingIBt 0.167 0.184
(52.82) (57.88)
CorrTradingIBt−1,t−5 -0.034 -0.036
(-15.97) (-17.22)
|CorrTrading|HFTt -0.001
(-0.281)
|CorrTrading|HFTt−1,t−5 0.010
(2.462)
|CorrTrading|IBt -0.006
(-1.953)
|CorrTrading|IBt−1,t−5 0.002
(0.929)
OFHFTt × |CorrTrading|HFTt -0.040
(-3.688)
OFHFTt−1,t−5 × |CorrTrading|HFTt−1,t−5 0.014
(1.853)
OF IBt × |CorrTrading|IBt -0.060
(-16.57)
OF IBt−1,t−5 × |CorrTrading|IBt−1,t−5 0.010
(3.800)
Wald test H0 : β
HFT
Corr,0 = β
IB
Corr,0 (p-values) 0.000 0.000
Wald test H0 :
∑5
i=1 β
HFT
Corr,i =
∑5
i=1 β
IB
Corr,i (p-values) 0.000 0.000
Figure 1: Lag-by-lag responses to trades by firms in the same category.
The figure displays the total responses across all traders in either category
(HFT or IB) to a 100-share increase in past activity by all other traders in
that same category, across lags 1 to 10. Trade activity is measured either as
order flow, total volume, or net position. For a given lag, the responses are
calculated by first summing the parameters describing the response of firm
i to all firms j 6= i in the same category and then summing this quantity
across all firms i in the given category (i.e., the responses of HFTs to HFTs
are calculated as
∑
i
∑
j 6=i (A11,k)i,j for each lag k = 1, ..., 10). The resulting
double sum is scaled by 100 to represent the response to an activity change of
that size. The plotted values have a direct relationship with the coefficients
reported in Table 2, whereby the sum of the parameters across all lags in each
plot are identical to the corresponding coefficients in Table 2 scaled by 100.
The vertical bars surrounding each point in the graphs represent 95 percent
confidence intervals based on the bootstrapped standard errors.
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Figure 2: Lag-by-lag responses to trades by firms in the other category
The figure displays the total responses across all traders in either category
(HFT or IB) to a 100-share increase in past activity by all traders in the other
category, across lags 1 to 10. That is, the graphs show the responses of HFTs
to past trading by IBs and vice versa. Trade activity is measured either as
order flow, total volume, or net position. The responses are calculated in an
analogous manner to Figure 1. As per Figure 1, the plotted values have a
direct relationship with the coefficients reported in Table 2, whereby the sum
of the parameters across all lags in each plot are identical to the corresponding
coefficients in the table scaled by 100. The vertical bars surrounding each
point in the graphs represent 95 percent confidence intervals based on the
bootstrapped standard errors.
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